装修样本和正式合约不一样, 装修公司胜[2019]

装修选了20毫米大理石样本，合约却没写厚度，屋主可以要求退款吗？

案情与人物关系

1. 这宗案件发生在雪兰莪蒲种一间住宅的装修工程。几名屋主聘请一家装修公司负责住宅装修，包括一般装修、大理石供应及安装、电气工程等。后来双方为了“大理石到底应该是20毫米还是15毫米厚”发生严重争执。屋主在地庭胜诉，装修公司不服，上诉到吉隆坡高庭。高庭最终推翻地庭的裁决。

装修工程涉及多少钱？

2. 屋主要求装修公司退还三笔已经付款的钱，包括装修工程RM159,556.29、大理石工程RM129,850.00，以及电气工程RM9,632.54。装修公司则提出反诉，要求RM616,986.47特别损失、RM167,502.30装修利润，以及RM15,868.00和RM47,101.00的设计费用。因此，这并不是单纯为了几片大理石争吵，而是一宗涉及相当大金额的装修合约纠纷。

真正争议：样本是20毫米，合约却没有写20毫米

3. 双方的大理石合约写明，装修公司要供应及安装白底灰纹抛光大理石，也写了长度和宽度，却完全没有写大理石的厚度必须是20毫米。可是装修公司在之前曾经把一块样本交给屋主，而那块样本厚20毫米。屋主因此主张：既然我看到和选择的是20毫米样本，装修公司就应该供应20毫米的大理石。

屋主的主张

4. 屋主认为，这是一宗“凭样本买卖”。简单来说，就是卖家先给买家看一个样本，买家根据那个样本决定购买，所以真正交付的货物必须符合样本。屋主依赖《1957年货物买卖法令》第17条，主张装修公司既然展示了一块20毫米厚的大理石样本，就存在一个法律上的默示条件，即最终供应及安装的大理石也应该是20毫米厚。地庭接受了这个说法，并判屋主可以要求退款。

装修公司的抗辩和反诉

5. 装修公司则说，双方真正签署的大理石合约只是写明大理石的颜色、纹路、长度和宽度，没有任何地方写“20毫米”。装修公司也否认在签约之前曾经承诺一定供应20毫米厚的大理石。装修公司的立场是，那块样本主要是让屋主看大理石的颜色和纹路，并不是用来保证实际大理石的所有尺寸，包括厚度。

为什么书面文件对装修公司很重要？

6. 案件证据显示，屋主不但签了大理石报价单，而且曾亲手修改价钱。过后，屋主又要求把原本长方形的大理石改成更大的正方形大理石，尺寸最后写在修改后的地面图上。换句话说，双方曾经多次修改价钱、长度和宽度，而且这些修改都有写下来。可是从头到尾，都没有任何人把“20毫米厚”写进报价单、正式合约或修改后的地面图。

争执怎样正式爆发？

7. 后来装修公司的项目人员来到屋子，并告诉铺大理石的工人，要准备足够的水泥安装15毫米厚的大理石。屋主一听见“15毫米”，马上非常不满，坚持装修公司违反合约，并要求退还RM129,850的大理石订金。之后屋主发信追讨退款，律师也发出要求退款的信，最后屋主正式终止大理石合约。

法庭先问：看到样本，就一定等于“凭样本买卖”吗？

8. 高庭说，答案不是。根据《1957年货物买卖法令》第17条，必须先证明双方之间存在明示或默示的合约承诺，即卖家答应最终货物必须按照样本。卖家只是拿一个样本出来给买家看，并不会自动把整份合约变成“凭样本买卖”。真正的问题是：一个了解全部背景的合理人，会不会认为卖家已经作出了具有法律约束力的承诺，保证实际货物会按照样本。

高庭为什么不接受“20毫米是合约条件”？

9. 高庭特别注意到一个现实问题：如果20毫米厚真的对屋主如此重要，为什么屋主亲自修改报价单时没有把20毫米加进去？为什么后来屋主特别要求修改大理石长度和宽度，并叫设计人员写在平面图上时，也没有要求写上“20毫米”？高庭认为，这些同期文件与屋主后来在法庭所说“签约前已经明确要求20毫米”的证词并不一致。

书面合约写了什么，不能随便用口头说法加进去

10. 高庭进一步引用《1950年证据法令》第91条和第92条。简单来说，当双方已经把合约条件写成文件，原则上就应该从文件本身确定合约内容。除非符合法律所规定的例外情况，否则不能事后用口头证词去改变、增加、减少或推翻已经写进书面合约的条件。本案的大理石合约没有写20毫米，而地庭接受屋主的口头证词，把20毫米加进合约，高庭认为这是法律上的错误。

还有一个关键：真正的大理石根本还没有送到

11. 即使假设这真的是凭样本买卖，第17条主要要求实际供应的大批货物在品质上符合样本、买家有合理机会比较样本与实际货物，以及货物没有样本检查时看不出来、却使货物不能销售的缺陷。可是屋主在装修公司把整批大理石送来之前就已经终止合约。换句话说，法庭根本没有实际大理石可以和样本比较。因此，在事实和法律上，都无法认定装修公司已经违反第17条。

最终判决与法律意义

12. 高庭裁定地庭在法律和事实上出现明显错误，因此批准装修公司的上诉，撤销地庭原来的判决。案件被发回地庭，以计算装修公司因为屋主违反合约而应获得的损害赔偿。高庭同时判屋主支付RM15,000的上诉堂费。这个案件最重要的提醒很简单：装修、买卖、订制工程谈过什么并不足够，真正重要的条件最好清清楚楚写进合约。样本、照片、WhatsApp和口头说明可以很重要，但它们是否构成正式合约条件，必须看整个合约和证据，而不是单看其中一件东西。

法律总结

13. 真正昂贵的，从来不是律师咨询费，而是你为了省下咨询费而做错的每一个决定。法律问题最危险的不是没有答案，而是在没有专业分析前就乱回复、乱签文件、乱付款、乱妥协或一拖再拖；因为每拖一天、每走错一步，都可能失去关键证据、最佳时机与谈判筹码。等问题恶化才找律师，往往已不只是原本的案件，而是难以挽回的残局。
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A 20mm Marble Sample Was Shown, but the Written Contract Said Nothing About Thickness. Could the Homeowners Cancel the Contract and Demand a Refund?

Background and Parties

1. This Malaysian renovation dispute concerned a house in Puchong, Selangor. The homeowners engaged a renovation company to carry out various works at the premises, including renovation works, marble supply and installation, and electrical works. A serious disagreement later arose over one seemingly simple question: did the contractor promise to supply marble that was 20mm thick? The homeowners succeeded before the Sessions Court, but the contractor appealed. The Kuala Lumpur High Court ultimately reversed the Sessions Court’s decision.

The Money Involved

2. The homeowners sought refunds of RM159,556.29 paid under the renovation works contract, RM129,850.00 paid under the marble contract, and RM9,632.54 paid under the electrical works contract. The contractor, in turn, counterclaimed RM616,986.47 as special damages, RM167,502.30 as profit for renovation works, and two further sums of RM15,868.00 and RM47,101.00 for design works. This was therefore not a minor disagreement about a few pieces of marble. Substantial contractual liabilities depended on how the marble agreement was interpreted.

The Central Dispute

3. The written marble contract described the marble as white-based, grey-vein polished marble and specified its length and width. However, it contained no express term saying that the marble must be 20mm thick. Before the contract was performed, the contractor had nevertheless provided a marble sample measuring approximately 190mm by 90mm by 20mm. The homeowners therefore argued that the contractor had agreed to supply marble corresponding to that sample, including its 20mm thickness.

The Homeowners’ Claim

4. The homeowners relied on section 17 of the Sale of Goods Act 1957. Their position was that the marble transaction was a “sale by sample”. In simple language, they argued that when a seller shows a sample and the buyer contracts on that basis, the goods ultimately supplied must correspond with the sample. Because the sample shown to them was 20mm thick, they said there was an implied contractual condition that the marble eventually supplied and installed at the house must also be 20mm thick. The Sessions Court accepted this reasoning and allowed their claim for refunds.

The Contractor’s Defence and Counterclaim

5. The contractor argued that the written marble contract governed the parties’ agreement. The contract specified the colour, appearance and dimensions of the marble but nowhere stated that the thickness was 20mm. The contractor also disputed the homeowners’ evidence that, before the contract was signed, the contractor had specifically promised to supply 20mm marble. According to the contractor’s witnesses, the sample was principally provided to demonstrate the colour and appearance of the marble, not to guarantee that every physical dimension of the final marble slabs would match the small sample.

The Written Documents Became Critical Evidence

6. The High Court examined how the parties actually documented their negotiations. The first homeowner had signed and manually revised the original quotation, including negotiating a further discount. After that, he requested that the originally proposed rectangular marble slabs be changed to larger square slabs. That change was specifically written onto an amended marble floor plan. The evidence therefore showed that when the homeowners wanted changes to price, length or width, those changes were documented. Yet the alleged requirement of 20mm thickness was never inserted into the quotation, revised quotation, marble contract or amended floor plan.

How the Dispute Exploded

7. The confrontation occurred when the contractor’s project personnel attended the premises with the marble installer. The project representative told the installer to obtain sufficient cement for laying marble of 15mm thickness. The homeowners immediately objected and accused the contractor of failing to comply with the agreed specifications. They demanded repayment of the RM129,850.00 marble deposit. The homeowners later issued written demands, their solicitors demanded repayment, and they eventually terminated the marble contract.

Does Showing a Sample Automatically Create a Sale by Sample?

8. The High Court said no. Section 17 of the Sale of Goods Act 1957 applies where the contract contains an express or implied term that the sale is by sample. Merely showing or handing over a sample during negotiations does not automatically mean that the seller has contractually promised that the entire bulk will correspond to every feature of that sample. The court had to determine objectively whether a reasonable person, knowing the full background of the transaction, would understand that the seller had made a binding promise that the goods would conform to the sample.

Why the High Court Rejected the Alleged 20mm Term

9. The documentary history created a serious problem for the homeowners’ case. If 20mm thickness had truly been a fundamental contractual requirement, the High Court considered that the first homeowner could have inserted it when he manually amended the quotation. Likewise, when he later specifically instructed the contractor’s designer to record the revised length and width of the marble slabs on the amended floor plan, he could also have required “20mm thickness” to be written there. He did not do so. The High Court therefore found that his later oral evidence was inconsistent with the contemporaneous documents.

Written Contracts Cannot Simply Be Rewritten by Oral Evidence

10. The High Court also relied on sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act 1950. In simple terms, where contractual terms have been reduced into writing, the written document is the primary evidence of those terms. Subject to the recognised statutory exceptions, oral evidence cannot later be used to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from the written agreement. The marble contract did not say that the sale was by sample and did not say that the marble must be 20mm thick. The Sessions Court had effectively used the first homeowner’s oral testimony to insert a new 20mm term into the written contract. The High Court held that this was an error of law.

The Marble Had Not Even Been Delivered

11. There was another fundamental difficulty. Even if the marble contract had been a sale by sample, section 17(2) concerns whether the bulk corresponds with the sample in quality, whether the buyer has a reasonable opportunity to compare the bulk with the sample, and whether the goods are free from hidden defects rendering them unmerchantable. In this case, the homeowners terminated the marble contract before the bulk marble was delivered. They never inspected the bulk marble. Therefore, no actual comparison between the bulk marble and the sample could be made. The High Court held that it was factually and legally impossible to find a breach of section 17 on that basis.

Final Decision and Practical Legal Lesson

12. The High Court held that the Sessions Court was plainly wrong and allowed the contractor’s appeal. The Sessions Court’s decision was set aside. The matter was remitted to the Sessions Court for quantification of the contractor’s damages arising from the homeowners’ breach of contract, and the contractor was awarded RM15,000 in costs for the appeal. The practical lesson is straightforward: if colour, thickness, size, brand, origin, material or any other specification is important, put it clearly into the written agreement. A sample, photograph, WhatsApp discussion or oral representation can be relevant evidence, but whether it becomes a binding contractual term depends on the contract and the surrounding admissible evidence as a whole.

Legal Conclusion

13. What is truly expensive is never the legal consultation fee, but every wrong decision you make just to save it. The most dangerous part of a legal issue is not the lack of answers, but acting without professional advice—replying carelessly, signing documents blindly, making payments, agreeing to settlements, or simply delaying action. Every day lost and every wrong step taken may cost you critical evidence, the best timing, and your negotiation leverage. By the time the situation worsens, what you bring to a lawyer is often no longer the original problem, but a damaged and difficult-to-repair mess. What you pay for in a consultation is not just advice, but Wilson Kuek’s real case experience and professional judgment—helping you avoid mistakes, understand risks, and take the right first step. Do not trade today’s small savings for tomorrow’s much greater loss.
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Detailed English Legal Analysis

Introduction

1. Fuyu International Sdn Bhd v Lai Fui Pin & Ors [2019] MLJU 1687 was a civil appeal heard by the High Court at Kuala Lumpur before Faizah binti Jamaludin J on 23 October 2019. Fuyu International Sdn Bhd was the Defendant in the Sessions Court and became the Appellant before the High Court. The homeowners were the Plaintiffs in the Sessions Court and became the Respondents in the appeal. The High Court was asked to determine whether the Sessions Court had correctly treated the marble contract as a sale by sample and whether a 20mm thickness requirement could legally be implied into the written contract.

Factual Background

2. The Respondents were the registered proprietors of a residential house at Ambrosia @ Kinrara Residence in Puchong, Selangor. They appointed the Appellant to carry out renovation works at the premises. The dealings between them ultimately resulted in several contracts, including a renovation works contract, a marble supply and installation contract, and an electrical works contract.
3. The central dispute concerned the marble contract. The written contract described the material as white-based grey-vein polished marble and stated its dimensions, but it did not expressly provide that the marble must be 20mm thick. Nevertheless, a marble sample measuring approximately 190mm by 90mm by 20mm had been shown and handed to the Respondents. The Respondents relied on that sample to contend that 20mm thickness had become part of the contract.

The Respondents’ Claims and the Appellant’s Counterclaim

4. The Respondents claimed repayment of RM159,556.29 paid under the renovation works contract, RM129,850.00 paid under the marble contract, and RM9,632.54 paid under the electrical works contract. Their case was therefore framed substantially as a claim to recover monies already paid after the contractual relationship had broken down.
5. The Appellant counterclaimed RM616,986.47 as special damages, RM167,502.30 as profit for the renovation works, RM15,868.00 for one component of design works and RM47,101.00 for another component of design works. The High Court judgment records these sums as the Appellant’s counterclaim before the Sessions Court.
6. The Sessions Court accepted the Respondents’ argument that there was an implied contractual term pursuant to section 17 of the Sale of Goods Act 1957 because the marble sample shown to them was 20mm thick. It therefore allowed the Respondents’ refund claim and dismissed the Appellant’s counterclaim. The Appellant appealed against that decision.

The Appellant’s Case

7. The Appellant argued that the Sessions Court had erred both in law and fact by concluding that the marble contract contained an implied term requiring the Appellant to supply and install marble flooring of 20mm thickness. Its primary documentary argument was simple: the written marble contract stated that the Appellant was “to supply and install white based grey vein polished marble”, with specified dimensions, but there was no contractual term concerning thickness.
8. The Appellant further contended that the Respondents had produced no evidence establishing that, before or at the time the marble contract was issued, the Appellant had contractually proposed or agreed to supply 20mm marble. This was important because the Respondents were attempting to transform the physical thickness of the sample into a binding contractual specification.
9. The Appellant’s witnesses disputed the Respondents’ version. Lim Wei Wei denied that the first Respondent had demanded 20mm marble before the contract was made. Dato’ Lim Thean Seng testified that the sample was meant to show the colour of the marble rather than its dimensions. He pointed out that if the sample were intended to represent actual dimensions, it would have reflected the length and width stated in the contract rather than measuring only 190mm by 90mm.
10. The Appellant also relied heavily on the negotiation history. The evidence showed that various marble samples had initially been considered. The Respondents wanted white marble with fine or minimal grey veins. A supplier in China subsequently identified a product known as “Jazz White” and sent a sample. The Appellant then prepared a quotation after calculating the price, installation charges and profit.
11. The first Respondent manually amended the original quotation to obtain a further discount and signed it. Significantly, he did not add any term relating to 20mm thickness. Later, he requested larger square marble slabs instead of the originally proposed rectangular slabs. That amendment was specifically recorded on a revised floor plan. Again, no 20mm thickness requirement was recorded.

The Respondents’ Case

12. The Respondents maintained that the transaction was a sale by sample within section 17 of the Sale of Goods Act 1957. They argued that because the sample shown to them was 20mm thick, the bulk marble ultimately supplied was required to conform to that sample, including in thickness.
13. The first Respondent testified that, before entering the contract, the Respondents had expressly demanded marble of 20mm thickness and that Lim Wei Wei had represented that the Appellant had stock of such marble available for supply and installation. He said that the Respondents entered the marble contract in reliance upon that representation.
14. The first Respondent also relied on a WhatsApp communication sent on 13 October 2016 attaching a photograph of the marble sample. A physical sample measuring 190mm by 90mm by 20mm was later tendered at trial as exhibit P1. This was the principal factual basis upon which the Respondents connected the sample with their alleged 20mm requirement.
15. The dispute crystallised on 21 November 2016 when the Appellant’s representative Zoe attended the premises with the marble installer and instructed him to obtain sufficient cement for laying 15mm marble. According to Zoe, the Respondents reacted strongly and accused the Appellant of breaching the contract. The Respondents subsequently demanded repayment of the RM129,850.00 marble deposit and ultimately terminated the marble contract.

Applicable Law and Authorities Cited

16. The High Court first referred to the appellate principle stated in Gan York Chin (p) v Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng & Ors [2005] 2 MLJ 1; [2004] 4 CLJ 309 and Merita Merchant Bank Singapore Ltd v Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka [2014] MLJU 1906; [2014] 9 CLJ 1064; [2015] 1 AMR 575. The judgment stated the familiar rule that an appellate court should not set aside the decision of the court below unless the lower court was plainly wrong.
17. The substantive statutory provision was section 17 of the Sale of Goods Act 1957. Section 17(1) provides that a contract is a sale by sample where there is an express or implied term to that effect. Section 17(2) then implies conditions that the bulk must correspond with the sample in quality, that the buyer must have a reasonable opportunity to compare the bulk with the sample, and that the goods must be free from hidden defects rendering them unmerchantable which would not be apparent on reasonable examination of the sample.
18. The High Court referred to James Drummond and Sons v E.H. Van Igren & Co Ltd (1887) 12 App Cas 284 for the proposition that the function of a sample is to demonstrate the parties’ real intention concerning the subject matter where language may be insufficient to describe it. It also referred to Champanhac & Co Ltd v Waller & Co Ltd [1948] 2 All ER 724, where the sample was described as a means by which the seller may convey the type or description of goods offered for sale.
19. Importantly, the High Court stressed that not every display of a sample creates a sale by sample. There must be an express or implied contractual undertaking that the bulk will relate to the sample as required by section 17. The court applied an objective test: whether a reasonable person possessing full background knowledge of the transaction would understand the seller to have made a binding promise that the goods would conform to the sample.
20. In Gardiner v Gray (1815) 4 Camp 144, 171 ER 46, a sample of waste silk had been shown, but the written sale note did not state that the transaction was a sale by sample. The judgment records that Lord Ellenborough held that the contractual stipulation could not be added by oral evidence and that the sample had merely enabled the buyer to form a reasonable judgment of the goods. The High Court used this authority to illustrate why displaying a sample does not, by itself, establish a contractual warranty that the bulk will correspond with it.
21. By contrast, in Wasco Lindung Sdn Bhd v Lustre Metals & Minerals Sdn Bhd [2014] AMEJ 1307; [2015] 9 MLJ 610, contemporaneous emails showed that the buyer would purchase aluminium ingots only if a 500-gram sample passed testing. The sample was tested and found satisfactory, after which the buyer entered into a US$679,000 purchase contract. When the shipment arrived containing white powder instead of aluminium ingots, the court held that section 17(2)(a) imposed an implied condition that the goods received would correspond with the tested sample. The crucial difference was that the transaction documents showed that the purchase itself was premised upon the sample.

Court’s Analysis on the Evidence

22. The High Court considered the contemporaneous documents more persuasive than the first Respondent’s later assertion that 20mm thickness had always been an essential term. The first Respondent had negotiated and manually amended the price. He later requested changes to the length and width of the slabs and had those changes recorded on the floor plan. Yet he did not insert 20mm thickness into either document. The court therefore found his testimony inconsistent with the objective documentary history.
23. The High Court further held that the Sessions Court had approached the section 17 issue incorrectly. The lower court focused on whether the Respondents wanted 20mm marble and even referred to their ability to afford such marble. The High Court held that affordability was irrelevant. The proper questions were whether the parties had agreed that the transaction was a sale by sample and, if so, what binding promise concerning the sample had actually been made.
24. The High Court also referred to LG Thorne & Co v Thomas Borthwick & Sons (Asia) Ltd (1956) 56 SR (NSW) 81, which was cited for the principle that where the contract has been reduced to writing and the writing constitutes the whole agreement, parol evidence is not admissible merely to show that the transaction was intended to be a sale by sample. The judgment likewise referred to authorities including Re Faulkners Ltd (1917) 38 DLR 84, W & J Sharp v Thomson [1939] 3 DLR 695, and Compact Metals Industries Ltd v PPG Industries (Singapore) Ltd [2006] SGHC 242 as authorities discussed in Benjamin’s Sale of Goods supporting the proposition that mere exhibition of a sample does not necessarily make the transaction a sale by sample. The judgment does not set out the individual facts or holdings of those latter cases, so no further factual detail can properly be added.

Evidence Act 1950

25. The High Court then applied sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act 1950. Section 91 requires the written document itself to prove contractual terms once the parties have reduced their contract into documentary form. Section 92 then excludes oral evidence intended to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from those written terms, subject to the statutory provisos and illustrations.
26. The judgment referred to Tractors Malaysia Sdn Bhd v Kumpulan Pembinaan Malaysia Sdn Bhd [1979] 1 MLJ 129 (FC) for the principle that where a contract has been reduced to writing, the writing must be examined for the whole of the contractual terms. It also relied on Datuk Tang Leng Teck v Sarjana Sdn Bhd & Ors [1997] 4 MLJ 329, which explained that after the document has been produced under section 91, section 92 operates to exclude oral statements intended to vary or add to its terms. Finally, Tan Chong & Sons Motor Co (Sdn) Bhd v Alan McKnight [1983] 1 MLJ 220 was cited for the rule that oral evidence cannot contradict, vary, add to or subtract from a written agreement unless it falls within one of the statutory exceptions or illustrations.
27. Applying those principles, the High Court found that the marble contract was the best evidence of the parties’ agreement. It did not state that the transaction was a sale by sample and did not state that the marble had to be 20mm thick. The first Respondent himself admitted that there was no document relating to a 20mm thickness requirement. The Sessions Court had not identified any proviso or illustration under section 92 which permitted his oral evidence to be used to add that new term. The High Court therefore held that the Sessions Court had clearly erred in law.

Court’s Analysis of Section 17

28. The High Court identified an additional and independent defect in the Respondents’ case. Even if the contract had been a sale by sample, the statutory conditions under section 17(2) concern comparison between the sample and the bulk goods actually supplied. Yet the Respondents terminated the marble contract before the Appellant delivered the bulk marble. They had never inspected the bulk marble and therefore could not show that the bulk failed to correspond with the sample in quality or was unmerchantable.
29. The High Court consequently held that it was factually and legally impossible for the Sessions Court to conclude that the Appellant had breached a section 17 implied condition. There was no delivered bulk marble against which the sample could be compared. The court further held that section 17 did not imply a term merely because the buyer wanted a particular thickness or could afford marble of that thickness.

Final Decision and Orders

1. 30. The High Court allowed the Appellant’s appeal, set aside the Sessions Court’s decision and remitted the matter to the Sessions Court for quantification of the Appellant’s damages arising from the Respondents’ breach of contract. The Appellant was also awarded RM15,000 in costs for the appeal, payable by the Respondents subject to allocatur.

Source: Fuyu International Sdn Bhd v Lai Fui Pin & Ors [2019] MLJU 1687. HC Kuala Lumpur. Faizah binti Jamaludin J. 23 October 2019.

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#Section 91 #Section 92

1. 大理石样本20mm，合约没写厚度还能退款吗？｜20mm Marble Sample but No Thickness in Contract: Can the Buyer Get a Refund?；2. 装修样本和正式合约不一样，法院看哪一个？｜Sample vs Written Renovation Contract: Which One Will the Court Follow?；3. 装修公司给了20mm样本，最后用15mm算违约吗？｜20mm Sample but 15mm Marble: Is It a Breach of Contract?；4. 买东西看过样本，就一定属于凭样本买卖吗？｜Does Seeing a Sample Automatically Make It a Sale by Sample?；5. 装修合约没写的条件，可以靠口头承诺补进去吗？｜Can an Oral Promise Add a Missing Term to a Written Renovation Contract?；6. 屋主取消大理石合约追讨RM129,850，为什么高庭推翻判决？｜Homeowners Cancelled Marble Contract and Claimed RM129,850: Why Did the High Court Reverse the Decision?；7. 大理石厚度没写进合约，20mm样本够不够？｜20mm Marble Sample but No Written Thickness: Is the Sample Enough?；8. 马来西亚装修合约纠纷：样本、报价单和口头承诺谁最大？｜Malaysia Renovation Contract Dispute: Sample, Quotation or Oral Promise?；9. Sale by Sample是什么？马来西亚高庭这样解释｜What Is a Sale by Sample? Malaysian High Court Explains；10. 装修工程规格没写清楚，法院会替你补条件吗？｜Missing Renovation Specifications: Will the Court Add the Term for You?；11. 货物还没送到，可以先告卖家违反Sample吗？｜Can a Buyer Claim Breach of Sample Before the Goods Are Delivered?；12. 大理石还没送到就终止合约，买家为何败诉？｜Buyer Terminated Before Marble Delivery: Why the Claim Failed；13. Evidence Act第92条：口头承诺能推翻书面合约吗？｜Evidence Act Section 92: Can Oral Promises Override a Written Contract?；14. 装修报价单签了以后，还能说另有口头条件吗？｜After Signing a Renovation Quotation, Can You Rely on Extra Oral Terms?；15. 样本20mm、实际计划15mm：一宗装修合约上诉案｜20mm Sample, 15mm Planned Marble: A Renovation Contract Appeal；16. 装修订金可以因为材料规格争议要求全退吗？｜Can a Renovation Deposit Be Fully Refunded Over a Material Specification Dispute?；17. 马来西亚装修官司：关键规格一定要写进合约｜Malaysia Renovation Lawsuit: Important Specifications Must Be Written Down；18. 只看Sample不写进Contract，出事后谁承担风险？｜Relying on a Sample Without Writing It into the Contract: Who Bears the Risk?；19. Sale of Goods Act第17条怎样影响装修材料纠纷？｜How Section 17 Sale of Goods Act Affects Renovation Material Disputes；20. 装修合约最危险的错误：重要规格只讲不写｜The Most Dangerous Renovation Contract Mistake: Important Terms Spoken but Not Written。

1. 20mm还是15mm？｜20mm or 15mm?；2. 一块样本引爆装修官司｜The Sample That Triggered a Lawsuit；3. 合约没写20mm｜20mm Was Never Written；4. 大理石之争｜The Marble Dispute；5. 样本对决合约｜Sample vs Contract；6. RM129,850订金之战｜The RM129,850 Deposit Battle；7. 这块Sample算承诺吗？｜Was This Sample a Promise?；8. 装修合约翻盘｜Renovation Contract Reversed；9. 15mm一句话引爆官司｜One “15mm” Remark Started the Fight；10. 写了才算？｜If It Is Not Written, Does It Count?；11. Marble Sample陷阱｜The Marble Sample Trap；12. Sample不是Contract？｜A Sample Is Not the Contract?；13. 20mm消失的合约条件｜The Missing 20mm Term；14. 装修订金谁拿走？｜Who Gets the Renovation Deposit?；15. 货还没到，能说违约？｜No Delivery Yet—Can There Be a Breach?；16. 口头承诺大战书面合约｜Oral Promise vs Written Contract；17. 一张报价单决定输赢｜The Quotation That Changed the Case；18. 高庭推翻装修判决｜High Court Reverses Renovation Decision；19. 大理石还没送到｜The Marble Was Never Delivered；20. 千万别只相信Sample｜Never Rely on the Sample Alone。

1. 马来西亚大理石装修合约纠纷｜Malaysia marble renovation contract dispute；2. 20mm大理石样本15mm实际材料｜20mm marble sample 15mm actual marble；3. Sale by Sample Malaysia Section 17｜马来西亚凭样本买卖第17条；4. 装修样本与书面合约冲突｜renovation sample versus written contract；5. 大理石厚度没有写进合约｜marble thickness not stated in contract；6. 装修口头承诺能否成为合约条款｜oral promise renovation contract Malaysia；7. Evidence Act 1950 Section 92 contract｜1950年证据法令第92条合约；8. Section 91 Evidence Act written contract Malaysia｜证据法令第91条书面合约；9. 装修订金退款大理石纠纷｜renovation deposit refund marble dispute；10. bulk goods not delivered sale by sample｜凭样本买卖货物未交付；11. marble sample contractual term Malaysia｜马来西亚大理石样本合约条件；12. contractor sample does not match specification｜装修商样本与规格纠纷；13. 20mm marble contractual promise｜20毫米大理石合约承诺；14. written quotation oral agreement Malaysia｜马来西亚报价单与口头协议；15. renovation quotation dispute Malaysia｜马来西亚装修报价单纠纷；16. terminate marble contract before delivery｜大理石交货前终止合约；17. Section 17 Sale of Goods Act renovation｜货物买卖法第17条装修材料；18. parol evidence rule Malaysia contract｜马来西亚口头证据规则合约；19. Fuyu International Lai Fui Pin marble case｜Fuyu International大理石案例；20. Malaysia renovation material specification lawsuit｜马来西亚装修材料规格官司。